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Criminal Procedure-The Defendant Must Show That the
Prosecutor's Failure to Record Grand Jury Testimonies
Amounted to a Prosecutorial Misconduct in Order to Give
the Trial Court Cause to Dismiss the Indictment or
Bar the Trial Testimonies of the Unrecorded Witnesses
United States v. Head*
I. Introduction
In United States v. Head, I the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit considered whether the conduct of the prosecutor, 'n preventing the
recording of grand jury testimonies of prosecution witnesses, created an unfair
tactical advantage warranting either a dismissal of the indictment or striking of
the trial testimonies of the unrecorded witnesses. The Fifth Circuit recognized
that a failure to record grand jury statements of the prosecution's key witnesses
denied the defendant his right to seek production of them under the Jencks
Act. 2 The court held:
[Tihe prosecutor should not have selectively recorded the testimony of grand
jury witnesses, but that defendant . . . wholly failed to show this mistake
amounted to a prosecutorial misconduct warranting dismissal of the indict-
ment or a bar of the use of the testimony of the witnesses whose testimony
[had] not [been] recorded.3
In 1979, rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was amend-
ed to require that all grand jury statements be recorded. 4 Notwith-
standing this amendment, the decision in Head remains important because it
provides a standard for determining whether a failure to record would amount
to misconduct warranting a dismissal of the indictment or striking of the trial
testimonies of the unrecorded witnesses. Furthermore, the decision in Head is
* 586 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1978).
I Id.
2 18 U.S.C. S 3500(b) (1976), provides in relevant part:
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as
hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the sub-
ject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate
to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered direct-
ly to the defendant for his examination and use.
3 586 F.2d at 512.
4 FFD. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) provides:
(e) RECORDING AND DISCLOSURE OF PROCEEDINGS.
(1) Recording of Proceedings. All proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or
voting shall be recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. An unintentional
failure of any recording to reproduce all or any portion of a proceeding shall not affect the validity
of the prosecution. The recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared therefrom shall
remain in the custody or control of the attorney for the government unless otherwise ordered by
the court in a particular case.
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consistent with the current judicial trend in dealing with criminal discovery
procedures. 5 Although in recent years requirements have been established to
provide for criminal discovery of grand jury statements upon a showing by the
defendant of "particularized need," 6 courts have narrowly interpreted the
"particularized need" requirement. 7 They have been reluctant to reverse an
otherwise valid conviction because of a failure to produce grand jury
statements. Similarly, the court in Head recognized the need to record grand
jury statements but concluded that a failure to record would not automatically
warrant strict judicial relief.
II. Statement of the Facts
John Leslie Head, Jr., was brought before a grand jury on charges of con-
spiring to import marijuana in violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.8 The defendant had knowingly conspired
to rent boats for use in smuggling marijuana into the United States. 9 He had
arranged meetings between two of the smugglers and two men from whom the
boats were to be rented. He did not know, however, that the boat owners were
also government informants, who were tape recording many of their conversa-
tions with the defendant and the other conspirators. A court reporter was
present at the grand jury hearing and recorded the testimonies of the defendant
and his three supporting witnesses. At the request of the prosecutor, no record-
ings were made by the court reporter of the informants' grand jury testimonies.
The grand jury indicted the defendant as charged and the case was tried before
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
At trial, the defendant moved to bar the testimonies of the informants
because he had not been able to inspect their grand jury statements as provided
in the Jencks Act.10 In support of his motion, he called to the stand the As-
sistant United States Attorney who had presented the case to the grand jury.
The Assistant United States Attorney testifed that there were up to fifty tape
recordings made by the informants and that he did not want to create any
more. He also reasoned that the transcript of their grand jury testimonies
would not be new testimony because the informants would not, under the cir-
cumstances, be in a position "to recant or to change or to fabricate their
testimon[ies]."" The conversations recorded by the informants had been
received into evidence and played to the trial jury, after having been authen-
5 See text accompanying notes 26-52 infra.
6 See text accompanying notes 42-49 infra.
7 See, e.g., Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969);
United States v. Allegretti, 340 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1964); Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964); Brilliant v. United States, 297 F.2d 385 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 871 (1962).
8 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960, 963 (1976).
9 The defendant admitted to these facts at trial. See 586 F.2d at 509.
10 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1976), provides in relevant part:
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under subsection (b)
or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such portions thereof as the court
may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall
proceed unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests ofjustice require that a
mistrial be declared.
11 586 F.2d at 510.
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ticated by the informants. In addition, the defendant had been furnished with
copies of written statements made by the informants. Based on these facts, the
trial court dismissed the motion to bar the informants' testimonies. The defen-
dant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The appellate court concluded that the prosecutor should not have selec-
tively recorded the testimonies of the grand jury witnesses. It said, however,
that the defendant failed to show that this mistake amounted to prosecutorial
misconduct sufficient to warrant judicial relief. He failed to show that the
unrecorded statements would have provided additional information either to
aid him in preparing and conducting his cross-examination or to establish that
a witness had made a secret, contrary statement. The court concluded,
therefore, that the effect of the prosecutor's conduct did not warrant dismissal
of the indictment or striking of the trial testimonies of the unrecorded
witnesses. The court said that, in order to establish prosecutorial misconduct
warranting such judicial remedies, the defendant must offer some indication
that the prosecutor's actions prejudiced him in making his defense. 12
III. The Opinion in Head
In Head, the Fifth Circuit recognized that, although rule 6(d) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 permitted the recording of grand jury
testimonies, there was no statutory requirement that all grand jury proceedings
be recorded. At the same time, however, it commented that it was a "far better
practice" to make such recordings.1 4 Indeed, as some commentators have
recognized, a failure to record could be interpreted as an attempt, on the part
of the prosecutor, to restrict the discovery privileges otherwise available to the
defense under the Jencks Act.' 5
Although the court, in Head, recommended that all grand jury pro-
ceedings be recorded, it refused to hold that a failure to record automatically
amounted to prosecutorial misconduct warranting judicial relief. This decision
is consistent with prior Fifth Circuit decisions. As an example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Head, cited United States v. Cruz16 in which it rejected a claim that the
Government was bound to call its best available witnesses before the grand
jury, so that their testimonies could be recorded and become statements
available to the defense under the Jencks Act. In Cruz, the court stated, "no
part of the Jencks Act has ever been construed to require the [G]overnment to
12 Id. at 512.
13 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) provides:
(d) Who May Be Present. Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, in-
terpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking evidence, a stenographer or operator of a
recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than the
jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting.
14 586 F.2d at 511. See also United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 67
(1978), in which the Fifth Circuit held that there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that all
grand jury proceedings be recorded.
15 See, e.g., Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal for a New Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 307 (1969).
16 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
[April 1980]
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develop potential Jencks Act statements so that such materials could be combed
in the hopes of obtaining impeaching inconsistencies."17
The court recognized that the situation in Head more closely resembled a
situation in which a prosecutor, who possessed several Jencks Act statements of
a single witness, destroyed one of them but delivered the remaining statements
to the defendant. 1 8 The court found that such action would be improper even
though the prosecutor believed that the statement destroyed was duplicated by
the information in the remaining statements. It concluded, however, that the
prosecutor's action would not constitute misconduct which would abort the
prosecution or bar jury access to the witness' trial testimony in the absence of
some indication of "particularized prejudice."' 9 In addition, it developed a
standard for determining the existence of "particularized prejudice."
To establish "particularized prejudice," the defendant must show not
merely that he was denied specific grand jury statements, but more significant-
ly that the denial of the statements "thwarted" one of the two goals of the
Jencks Act. 20 The court defined those goals to be: to enable the defense to con-
duct its cross-examination in light of the facts known to the prosecution and to
assure the defense that a witness had made no secret, contrary statement.
The court concluded that the defense had failed to show that either of these
goals was "thwarted" by the prosecutor's failure to record. It found that the
defense had been able to conduct its cross-examination in light of all the infor-
mation available to the prosecution because numerous other tape recordings
and written statements by the informants, which duplicated the information
contained in the unrecorded statements, were available to the defense. In addi-
tion, it found that the defense had been assured that the informants had made
no secret, contrary statements. The court said that the recordings made by the
informants during their conversations with the defendant provided the best
evidence of the events. At trial, the informants were completely "cabined" by
these recordings when they recounted the events leading to the arrest. 2' The
defendant and the trial jury were able to hear the tape recordings and deter-
mine whether the informants' trial accounts were consistent with them.
The court noted that a similar standard for determining the existence of
prejudice was endorsed in the Fifth Circuit case of Calley v. Callaway.22 In
Calley, a congressional committee released the names of the witnesses it had ex-
amined in executive session but refused to provide the court with a transcript of
their testimonies. The defendant, however, was furnished with other
statements by each of the witnesses named. Without reaching a Jencks Act
issue, the court held that nondisclosure did not necessarily deprive Calley of
due process. It required Calley to establish some indication that disclosure
"would have enabled [him] significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his
17 Id. at 411. The court recognized that the situation in Head is distinguishable. The witnesses in Head
actually appeared before the grand jury but, at the request of the prosecutor, their statements were not
recorded.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1978).
19 586 F.2d at 512.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
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favor. ", 23 Similarly, in Head, the court required an indication that the grand
jury testimonies of the informants differed substantially from their testimonies
at trial, in order to find error in the trial court's refusal to bar the testimonies.
The court found that, because the informants' prior disclosures were complete-
ly consistent with their trial testimonies and "totally incriminating of Head," ,24
the defendant did not even come close to making the required showing.
IV. The Development of the Jencks Act and the
Recording Requirement of Rule 6(e)
A. The Development of the Jencks Act and the Trend in Criminal Discovery Rules
In Head, the Fifth Circuit stated that the purpose of the Jencks Act is "to
reinforce the credibility of the criminal justice process" 25 by requiring the pros-
ecution to furnish the statements of any witness it calls to testify at trial so that
the defense can conduct its cross-examination in light of all the facts known to
the prosecutor. This interpretation of the Jencks Act is consistent with the
general view of the Act as, in part, a statutory attempt to balance the need for
criminal discovery against the need to maintain the traditional secrecy of the
grand jury. The Jencks Act has played a major role in the movement toward
more liberal procedures governing the disclosure of grand jury statements. 26
This movement does not endorse the wholesale disclosure of such statements;
rather, it attempts to promote the "proper administration of justice" 27 by
allowing the discovery only of certain, relevant statements in the Government's
possession which would enable the defendant to prepare his case. Failure to
produce grand jury statements would not automatically reverse an otherwise
valid conviction unless the defendant could show that a "particularized need"
existed for the statements.
Federal courts have always guarded the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings. 28 Whereas the prosecutor has enjoyed the use of grand jury
minutes in preparing his case, the defendant has rarely been given access to
them. 29 Judicial resistance to criminal discovery of grand jury minutes has
been based on the premise that liberalizing discovery would give the defendant
a disproportionate advantage over the prosecution in preparing his case.30
23 Id. at 222.
24 586 F.2d at 512.
25 Id.
26 For a discussion of the movement toward more liberal procedures governing the disclosure of grand
jury statements, see Knudsen, Pretrial Disclosure of Federal GrandJury Testimony, 48 WASH. L. RFv. 423 (1973).
27 See text accompanying note 49 infra.
28 Knudsen, supra note 26, at 430. For a general, historical discussion of grand jury secrecy, see
Calkins, GrandJury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455 (1964); Comment, GrandJury Secrecy: Should Witnesses Have
Access to Their Grand Jury Testimonies as a Matter of Right?, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804 (1973).
29 Comment, supra note 15, at 308.
30 Judicial reaction to criminal discovery of grand jury transcripts was exemplified by Judge Learned
Hand who stated:
Under our criminal procedure, the accused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held
rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least doubt in the
minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been
able to see.
United States v. Garson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
[April 1980]
COMMENTS
In spite of judicial resistance, the veil of secrecy has been lifted in certain
situations "when the ends ofjustice requir[ed] it."31 Early case law concerning
limitations on grand jury secrecy was codified with the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.A2 Rule 6(e)33 provided disclosure in in-
stances when the defendant was able to show that "grounds [might have ex-
isted] for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury" or "when so directed by a court preliminary to or in
connection with a judicial proceeding." 3 4 Although this rule attempted to pro-
vide federal courts with a uniform requirement for handling matters of grand
jury secrecy, it did not include standards for determining when disclosure of
statements would be appropriate. Often the courts narrowly interpreted the
situations in which disclosure would be granted. They were reluctant to grant
discovery in the absence of any showing of inconsistency between a witness'
trial testimony and his pretrial statements. 35
In 1957, the Supreme Court took a giant step toward liberal criminal
discovery rules by allowing disclosure of pretrial reports without a showing of
inconsistency. InJencks v. United States, 3 6 the Court held that the defendant was
entitled to inspect pretrial reports given to the F.B.I. by the prosecution's
witnesses in order to decide whether to use the reports in his defense. The
Court specified that no preliminary foundation of inconsistency between the
witnesses' reports to the F.B.I. and their testimonies at trial needed to be
shown. 37 UnderJencks, there were only two requirements for production: (1)
the witnesses whose statements were requested must have already testified on
direct; and (2) the requested statements must appear relevant, competent, and
31 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940).
32 18 U.S.C. §5 1-60 (1976).
33 FED. R. CRIUM. P. 6(e) (1946), as originally enacted, provided:
(e) Secrecy of proceedings and disclosure.-Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand
jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the
government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter,
stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court
preliminarily to or in connection with ajudicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the in-
dictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy may be im-
posed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The court may direct that an indict-
ment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has given bail, and in that event the
clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except
when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
Rule 6(e) was amended in 1977 to provide in relevant part:
(2)(c) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may
also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding;
or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds
may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand
jury.
Rule 6(e) was also amended in 1979. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
34 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(c).
35 See Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 418 (1953), in which the Court stated that, in order to
find error in the lower court's refusal to permit disclosure, the defendant must show that the requested
documents "were contradictory of [the witness'] present testimony, and that the contradiction was as to
relevant, important and material matters which bore directly on the main issue being tried." See also Shelton
v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), applying the decision in Gor-
don.
36 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
37 Id. at 666.
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outside the scope of any exclusionary rule. 38 The Court suggested that these re-
quirements would prevent "any broad or blind fishing expedition among
documents possessed by the Government on the chance that something might
turn up. " ,39
At first, it was unclear whether the Court's decision in Jencks applied to
statements made by prosecution witnesses before a grand jury. 40 In 1958,
however, an attempt was made to end the confusion with the enactment of the
Jencks Act which limited the holding in Jencks to discovery of pretrial
statements and reports made by testifying witnesses to government agents. It
omitted any reference to grand jury proceedings. 41 In the same year, the
Supreme Court restricted discovery of grand jury statements to situations in
which a "particularized need" for the material had been shown. In United
States v. Procter & Gamble,42 the Court stated that the " 'indispensible [sic]
secrecy of grand jury proceedings' . . . must not be broken except where there
is a compelling necessity. There are instances when that need will outweigh the
countervailing policy. But they must be shown with particularity." 43
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 44 the Supreme Court confirmed
the "particularized need" standard as the guide to the exercise of judicial
discretion under rule 6(e). The Court, in a five-four decision, rejected the pro-
posed extension of the Jencks Act to grand jury testimony and held that rule
6(e) continued to cover these proceedings.4 5 It remained the defendant's
burden to show that a "particularized need" existed for the statements which
outweighed the need for secrecy. 4
6
Whereas in Procter & Gamble, the Supreme Court developed the "par-
ticularized need" standard to curb the defendant's request for "wholesale" 47
discovery; in Dennis v. United States,48 the Court was forced to consider the im-
plications of the standard in dealing with a limited request for discovery. It said
that recent developments making grand jury testimony available to defendants
were "entirely consonant with the growing realization that disclosure, rather
than suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper ad-
ministration of justice."' 49 A showing of "particularized need" must be bal-
38 Id. at 667.
39 Id.
40 Comment, The Impact ofJencks v. United States and Subsequent Legislation on the Secrecy of GrandJuy
Minutes, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 244 (1958).
41 From the legislative history of the Act, it is clear the Congress intended to exclude grand jury pro-
ceedings from the operation of the statute. The appendix to Senate Report No. 981 states that theJencks Act
was not intended to affect the disclosure of grand jury testimony:
It should be noted that grand jury testimony is protected from disclosure by a Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure, 6(e), and it is within the discretion of the trial judge to decide when grand
jury testimony is to be revealed to the defense after a proper foundation is laid. Jencks makes no
reference to this rule and such a disclosure was not mentioned directly or indirectly in the opin-
ion.
S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [19571 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1861, 1868.
42 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
43 Id. at 682, citing United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513 (1943).
44 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
45 Justice Clark, in the majority opinion, wrote: "[T~he federal trial courts as well as the Courts of Ap-
peals have been nearly unanimous in regarding disclosure as committed to the discretion of the trial judge.
Our cases announce the same principle, and Rule 6(e) is but declaratory of it." Id. at 399.
46 Id. at 400.
47 356 U.S. at 683.
48 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
49 Id. at 870.
[April 1980]
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anced against the need for maintaining secrecy. When it is conceded that the
need to preserve grand jury secrecy is minimal, the balance is clearly tipped in
favor of disclosure.50
In 1970, the balance was again tipped in favor of disclosure. A provision
was added to the Organized Crime Control Act of 197051 which amended the
Jencks Act to include grand jury testimony.5 2 This amendment granted the
defense the right to grand jury testimony provided that the witness whose state-
ment was requested had already testified on direct examination and that the re-
quested statement was related to the subject matter of the witness' trial
testimony.
Although the Jencks Act, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
these several Supreme Court decisions announced a defendant's right to
disclosure of grand jury statements, they have not endorsed wholesale
disclosure of such statements. The language of the standards established in
these cases and statutes has allowed for broad judicial discretion in determining
when the need for criminal discovery has been properly balanced against the
need to maintain traditional grand jury secrecy. Such judicial discretion pro-
tects against abuses in the discovery privilege and assures that the defense will
not have a disproportionate advantage over the prosecution.
B. The Recording Requirement of Rule 6(e)53
Although the Jencks Act has allowed discovery of grand jury statements,
until recently there was no requirement that grand jury statements be recorded
to ensure the availability ofJencks Act materials. For a number of years, courts
have recognized that the "better practice" is to record grand jury statements.5 4
Finally, after several legislative attempts to adopt such a requirement, 55 an
50 Comment, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 438, 452 (1979). See I C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 108, at 183 (1969), which states:
It seems to be a fair reading of Dennis that defendant should always have access to the grand jury
testimony of witnesses who testified against him at trial, at least to the extent that the grand jury
testimony is related to the subject matter of the trial testimony. Anything less would be inconsis-
tent with the statements in Dennis that it is for the advocate, not the trial judge, to decide what
may be useful for impeachment ...
51 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 102, 84 Stat. 922 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970)).
52 For legislative history, see H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 41, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4017. The amended version of the Jencks Act provides, in relevant part:
"The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c) and (d) of this section in relation to any witness called
by the United States, means-(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any,
made by said witness to a grand jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1976).
53 See note 4 supra.
54 See, e.g., United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972);
United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); Schlinsky v. United
States, 379 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1967).
55 The 95th Congress was active in the area of grand jury reform. Specifically, H.R. 94, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., 123 CONG. REG. 81 (1977), introduced by Representative Joshua Eilberg, and S. 3405, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 13257 (1978), introduced by SenatorJames Abourezk, contained provi-
sions to amend the Federal Rules to include a recording requirement. The bills were referred to the House
.and Senate Committees on theJudiciary, respectively, but the Congress adjourned before action was taken
on either bill.
For a number of years, the American Bar Association also urged that rule 6(e) be amended to require
the recording of all accusatorial grand jury proceedings. In 1965, the ABA recommended that an amend-
ment to the Federal Rules be enacted to provide for a court reporter to transcribe the minutes of all grand
jury proceedings and for the cost of the transcript to be borne by the Government. It also recommended that
similar action be taken in the states either by changes in the rules of court or by the enactment of necessary
legislation. Finally, it recommended that a copy of the grand jury minutes be furnished to the defendant, as
[Vol. 55:590]
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amendment to rule 6(e) was enacted to require the recording of all grand jury
statements.
56
The amendment to rule 6(e) contains three provisions. First, it requires
that all grand jury proceedings, except during deliberations and voting, be
recorded stenographically or by an electronic recording device. Second, it
states that an unintentional failure of any recording to reproduce all or any por-
tion of a proceeding will not affect the validity of the prosecution. Third, it pro-
vides that the recording or reporter's notes or any transcript prepared
therefrom will remain in the custody or control of the attorney for the Govern-
ment unless otherwise ordered by the court in a particular case. The Advisory
Committee Note to rule 6(e) indicates, however, that the amendment deals on-
ly with the recording requirement and, in no way, expands the circumstances
in which disclosure of grand jury proceedings is permitted or required. 57 The
matter of disclosure continues to be governed by other provisions such as rule
16(a),5 8 the Jencks Act, and the remaining provisions of rule 6(e).
V. The Validity of Head in Light of the Recording
Requirement of Rule 6(e)
In Head, the Fifth Circuit stated that it was the "better practice" to record
all grand jury statements. With the recent amendment to rule 6(e), the "better
practice" became law. Although the amendment established the black-letter
requirement to record grand jury proceedings, it failed to address two related
issues: (1) whether a failure to record would amount to misconduct sufficient to
warrant a dismissal of the indictment or striking of the trial testimonies of the
unrecorded witnesses, and (2) what other forms of judicial relief would be
available for violations of the requirement. Even though Head predates the
amendment, it supplements the amendment by offering a possible solution to
the first issue.5 9 Whereas the amendment established the recording require-
ment, the decision in Head provides a standard for measuring whether a failure
to record would amount to misconduct warranting such strict judicial
remedies. This standard requires the defendant to offer some indication that
the prosecutor's actions prejudiced him in making his defense.
There are three possible situations in which the recording requirement
could be violated. The amendment provides that an unintentional failure to
record would not affect the validity of the prosecution. Judicial relief in such
situations would not be warranted. Conversely, a failure to record with the
a matter of right, after an indictment has been returned against him. Report of the ABA Special Committee on
Federal Rules of Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 106 (1965). The same recommendation was made six years later. Report
of the ABA Special Committee on Federal Rules of Procedure, 52 F.R.D. 87, 95 (1971).
56 [1979] 25 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2255. The Supreme Court is given the authority to prescribe
changes in the rules of practice and procedure governing criminal cases. "Such rules shall not take effect un-
til they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice .... and until the expiration of ninety days
after they have been thus reported." 18 U.S.C. 5 3771 (1976).
57 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), Adv. Comm. Note, H.R. Doc. No. 96-112, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1979).
58 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) provides for disclosure by the government of any relevant written or recorded
statements made by the defendant, any prior criminal record of the defendant, any relevant documents and
tangible objects, and any relevant reports of examinations and tests.
59 It should be noted, however, that violations of rule 6(e)(1) will probably be few. A prosecutor who
knowingly violates a statutory requirement faces possible disciplinary action by his state bar association.
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specific intent to deny the defendant information not otherwise available to him
would be a blatant violation of the requirement warranting strict judicial relief.
The most difficult situation, however, would be one in which an intentional
failure to record did not result in a denial of information to the defendant. The
amendment fails to consider whether strict judicial relief would be warranted,
for example, in a situation in which the prosecutor selectively recorded the
grand jury testimonies knowing that the contents of the unrecorded statements
were otherwise available to the defendant. The decision in Head provides an
appropriate answer. Head states that strict judicial relief would not be war-
ranted, even if the grand jury statements were deliberately unrecorded, absent
a showing of "particularized prejudice" to the defendant's case.
Even though Head provides an answer to the first issue, the situation in
Head is distinguishable from a violation of rule 6(e) because Head was decided
without the benefit of the statutory recording requirement. An intentional
violation of the statute regardless of the motive of the violator or the lack of
prejudice to the case demands some form ofjudicial relief. Unlike the situation
in Head, an intentional violation of the recording requirement involves two
possible infringements: a possible infringement upon the rights of the defen-
dant and a general infringement upon the public policy. The actions of the
violator must therefore be judged not only in terms of their effect on the ability
of the defendant to make his case but also in terms of their overall effect on the
proper administration of justice. The decision in Head provides a possible solu-
tion to the first infringement: it denies strict judicial relief, such as a dismissal
of the indictment or a barring of the trial use of the unrecorded statements, ab-
sent a showing of "particularized prejudice" to the defendant's case. Head does
not, however, address the second issue of what other forms of judicial relief
would be available to satisfy a violation of the statutory requirement.
Contempt of court might be appropriate form of relief for an intentional
violation of the recording requirement. Under subsection (2) of rule 6(e), a
knowing violation of the requirement of secrecy "may be punished as contempt
of court." 60 The same form of relief might, therefore, be appropriate for an in-
tentional violation of the recording requirement provided that there is no addi-
tional infringement upon the rights of the defendant.
VI. Conclusion
The decision in Head supplements the recording requirement of rule 6(e).
It provides an answer to the question of whether a failure to record would
amount to prosecutorial misconduct warranting either a dismissal of the indict-
ment or striking of the trial testimonies of the unrecorded witnesses. Head was
decided, however, prior to the enactment of the amendment to rule 6(e);
therefore, Head does not address the second issue of what other forms ofjudicial
relief would be appropriate for an intentional violation of the statute when
there has been an infringement upon the public policy but not upon the rights
of the defendant. An answer to this question will only be determined after
60 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
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judicial interpretation of the statute. The current trend in applying the Jencks
Act and the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules has been one of restraint.
The federal courts have been reluctant to reverse an otherwise valid conviction
because of a failure to produce grand jury statements, unless the defendant has
made a positive showing that a "particularized need" existed for the
statements. It is therefore probable that the courts, in interpreting the record-
ing requirement of rule 6(e), will act in a similar manner. Like the Fifth Circuit
in Head, they will be reluctant to "thwart" the otherwise valid efforts of the
prosecution, by applying strict judicial remedies, absent a showing of "par-
ticularized prejudice."
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